Afterthoughts (2)

The Progressive feedback is quite consistently negative. Here's a good example: William Galston - Obama's Three Biggest Mistakes. Galston argues well that there were three big errors: not doing the deal in December; not locking Boehner in when he had agreed to $800 billion in new revenues; and not endorsing the Deficit Commission's findings.

I agree with Galston that the deal could have been done in December. Would this have been better? It might have been. But we forget that Obama wanted to have a debate about getting the country's fiscal house in order. He wanted to engage on budget and debt issues. He felt these issues weighed on the public's mind. People were afraid, he felt,  in some not fully articulate way, that the country's economy might somehow slip away. So he made a choice not to bury the debt ceiling question in December. He made a choice to engage. Good idea or bad? I think the decision will wear a bit better with time. We will see.

On Galston's second point, why didn't Obama lock Boehner in at $800 billion in new revenues? He didn't because Democratic legislators had revolted, and told him it was lunacy to give up the coming Bush tax cut expiration revenues in return for just $800 billion. He responded to his team, which I think he needed to do.

Galston's third critique is, in one form or another, echoed across the web. Why didn't Obama endorse the Deficit Commission and seize the high ground up front on the debt ceiling debate? Quite simply, I do not think he wanted to put entitlement reform on the table as a starting position. Remember, the Commission never officially issued a report. They could not get the required number of Republican votes. Paul Ryan did not sign on. It looked like Republicans would not support a balanced (spending cuts plus new revenues) approach. In fact it wasn't clear where they were headed on deficit reduction. Were they just going to play political chess, or were they serious about coming up with a plan? Obama did not want to put entitlements on the table without a real negotiating partner in the conversation.

And then there's the larger point, which looking back, we can see clearly: as soon as the Tea Party Freshmen were sworn in, a "going over the cliff crisis" was inevitable. They were going to use the debt ceiling debate to force transformational change. They did not care if the country defaulted. No negotiating strategy could change this dynamic. Once you have hostage takers and, yes, terrorists, inside your government, particularly if they control one House of Congress (or any other branch of government), the country is in  grave risk.


The hostage takers are deemed to be legitimate. They have a place at the negotiating table. And they can burn the economic house down. The only way to prevent a repeat performance in 2013, or the next time we need to raise the debt ceiling, is to vote them out of office.


This is the job ahead for 2012. With the tough economy, it will be an uphill fight.

Postscript: here are some links to more positive takes on our hostage drama:

Obama's Hope-a-Dope Strategy, Kevin Drum, Mother Jones. Calm and cool, not guns and knives, is a "way of being" for Obama and his team.

The Liberal Screech, Andrew Sullivan, The Daily Beast. Obama got the best deal possible, given that he was negotiating with radicals.

Obama's Pyrrhic Defeat. Comments from Sullivan's readers.

Obama's Pyrrhic Defeat (2) . More comments from Sullivan's readers.

The Beginning, Not the End. Another Andrew Sullivan piece saying it is too soon to tell how this will unfold in the larger context. What will the Super Committee do? What will happen in the election? What will happen to the Bush tax cuts?